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MARKETS AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
FRIENDS OR FOESt
Terry L. Andersont
If you take a course in environmental economics, you are likely to
be dazzled with fancy graphs using isoquants, budget constraints, and
even social welfare functions. From these fancy tools, F. Bator went
so far as to determine a "bliss point," suggesting that these tools could
take society to its maximum level of well-being. I still have the book
from which these graphs were taken and I can still remember dis-
tinctly sitting through this lecture and just thinking, can you believe
it? I am going to learn how to take society to its bliss point!
This type of analysis illustrates the way economists often approach
problems, namely using marginal analysis to maximize some value
subject to opportunity cost constraints. From this analysis follows
one of the main tenets of economics: if the marginal benefits are
greater than the marginal cost, do it. We economists think this mar-
ginal analysis is a pretty powerful way of thinking about the world. In
determining how clean the air should be, we need to know what the
additional benefits of clean air are, what the additional costs of clean
air are, and as long as the additional benefits exceed the additional
cost then clean it up. If you want to know whether to save an endan-
gered species, the answer is the same: if the marginal benefits exceed
the marginal costs, save it.
Let us apply this to the issue of wolf reintroduction into Yellow-
stone National Park. A few years ago, during the Clinton administra-
tion, Bruce Babbitt, then Secretary of the Interior, released a few Ca-
nadian timber wolves in Yellowstone with the idea that wolves were
an important missing link in the ecosystem. If you asked an econo-
mist about whether we should do this and, if so, how many wolves
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should be released, the answer would depend on marginal benefits
and marginal costs. If the marginal benefits of wolf reintroduction
exceed the marginal costs, reintroduce them. However, nobody asked
economists that question and, in fact, with most environmental issues,
nobody ever asks the economists. Indeed courts have even said the
laws do not allow decision makers to look at the costs and benefits. If
the law says clean it up, cleanup must occur regardless of costs. The
simple fact is that the notion of marginal benefits and marginal costs
and hence, the notion of efficiency, is not something on which most
people focus. As my colleague, Rick Stroup, put it after working at
the Department of Interior, "efficiency has no constituency."
But this does not necessarily mean that interested parties do not
focus on the benefits and costs they face. Rather, the benefits and
costs on which they focus depend on the hat they wear. Consider the
view from under a cowboy hat. People with livestock thought that we
had already reached the optimal number of wolves-zero-by putting
a bounty on wolves and shooting them. From this view, why would
you spend millions of dollars to undertake reintroduction?
Now consider the view from under the hunter's hat. From here the
benefits and costs are a little bit tougher to determine, because the
wolf may be a potential huntable species, in which case more wolves
could provide benefits to hunters, or it could be a predator on big
game animals such as elk, thus shifting the wolf to the cost side of the
equation. Given that the politics make it unlikely that wolves are not
going to be hunted in the near future and that the rapid growth in the
wolf population has taken a heavy toll on elk numbers in and around
Yellowstone, it is not surprising that hunters are increasingly conclud-
ing that the marginal costs of another wolf exceed the marginal bene-
fits.
What about the people who wear the "Smokey the Bear" hat and
manage Yellowstone? How do they perceive the benefits and costs?
If you know anything about budgets for parks, you know that one of
the driving factors in park budgets is visitors. And with wolves being
reintroduced into Yellowstone, the number of visitors, especially in
the winter, has increased. Furthermore, park managers now have
larger budgets for doing research on wolves. And, believing that their
mission is to maintain the Yellowstone ecosystem, they believe that
wolf reintroduction restored the park to "a full complement of verte-
brates." Therefore, for national park managers, the marginal benefits
of wolf reintroduction are greater than the marginal costs.
And how do environmentalists perceive the benefits and costs? In
the same way that ranchers see the costs as virtually infinite and the
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benefits as trivial, environmentalists see the benefits as virtually infi-
nite and the costs as trivial. From this perspective, wolves should be
allowed to increase with the only limit on wolf numbers coming from
the size of the prey populations.
Not surprisingly the views from this array of hats has generated
what author Hank Fischer called "wolf wars." Public policy regard-
ing wolves has been acrimonious to say the least, and unfortunately
such acrimony permeates environmental policy creating a gridlock at
the federal level.
My purpose here is to suggest that there is an alternative to politi-
cal environmentalism and that is free market environmentalism. To
develop this concept, I begin by describing environmental policy
since the 1970s and ask how well the political approach has worked. I
then explain how and why free market environmentalism would be a
better alternative.
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM
Consider some examples of how we have approached environ-
mental policy since the early 1970s. When national forest lands were
set aside in the early 1900s, the concern was that commercial logging
would lead to a timber famine that could only be prevented by having
public management of national forests for timber production and later
some other multiple uses such as grazing and recreation. President
Teddy Roosevelt got Gifford Pinchot, who knew a great deal about
managing forests from his experiences in Germany, to fashion the
U.S. Forest Service as an agency that would sustain timber produc-
tion. For decades, there was not much controversy about how na-
tional forests should be managed. Maximum sustainable yield was
the guiding principle and management was done mostly at the local
level where forest rangers knew about growing conditions.
Over time, however, national forest management has gotten more
controversial because there are many more voices coming from under
many different hats other than those wearing hard hats and carrying
chain saws. Take, for example, the issue of diseased and insect in-
fested trees. Sustainable timber management would harvest these
trees, but environmental interests would let nature take her course,
letting the trees die and decay or burn.
From these latter demands came the Wilderness Act of 1964,
which sailed through Congress with virtually no opposition. With no
lands totally closed to commodity production and motorized vehicles,
wilderness advocates called for wilderness designation of areas where
people would "leave only footprints and take only pictures." At the
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time the Act passed, advocates called for 20 million acres, but since
then we have set aside 120 million acres as official wilderness lands,
and under President Clinton's roadless rule, added another 58 million
acres that were not to be roaded.
It should come as no surprise that further wilderness designation is
controversial. For people who want commodity production, roads for
access, or trails for off-road-vehicles, the marginal costs of another
acre of wilderness exceed the marginal benefits, and vice versa for
wilderness advocates. When a wilderness bill was introduced in the
Senate calling for an additional 3 million acres of wilderness in Mon-
tana, the incumbent senator from Montana lost his seat in his reelec-
tion bid mainly because he supported this bill.
And wilderness designation is not the only controversial part of
forest management. Controversy abounds regarding whether the For-
est Service is doing its job in terms of maintaining the quality of those
forests. Wildfires dominate the news each summer in many western
states with residents pointing fingers at the U.S. Forest Service for
mismanagement. Recreational crowding is another problem. Hunters
complain of too many people hunting on public lands, campers com-
plain of insufficient camp spaces, and hikers complain of competition
from mountain bikes, horses, and off-road-vehicles.
If all the acrimony over use were not enough, the budgetary losses
raise many hackles and generate calls for an end to subsidies. Most
of the fiscal focus is on losses generated by commodity production.
For example, between 1994 and 1996, timber production on federal
lands lost approximately $290 million per year and grazing lost $66
million per year.
Such losses bring accusations of subsidies for logging companies.
It is questionable whether these losses are really subsidies because
they result more from the fact that expenditures by federal agencies
are high rather than because prices paid for timber or grass are low.
Especially in the case of logging, competitive bidding for timber
means that loggers are paying what the timber is worth. The Forest
Service loses money because it spends so much on processing the
sales. Accusations of subsidies for grazers on public land also
abound with environmentalists using subsidies as an argument for
eliminating grazing on public lands. In the early years of the Clinton
administration, environmentalists called for "No moo in '92" and
"Cattle free in '93." Despite these calls, however, even with allies in
the White House, cattle were not removed from the public domain
and grazing fees generally went down, not up.
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Clearly, commodity production on federal lands does lose money,
but consider the biggest money loser of all, recreation. Those of us
who backpack, fish, hunt, camp, and picnic are the biggest pigs at the
public land trough. For the years 1994 through 1996, recreation on
federal lands lost $355 million per year. Our demands for trails,
roads, campgrounds, signs, rescues-and the list goes on and on-
cost money. And for the most part we pay nothing for our public land
use. Given that we are getting something of great value for free, this
is a real subsidy.
Let me turn to another example of political environmentalism, the
Endangered Species Act. When the act was passed, the bald eagle
was the poster child for passage. Here was the national bird going
extinct, and no one was going to ask an economist to do a benefit cost
analysis of whether it was worth saving. The Endangered Species
Act, like the Wilderness Act, sailed through Congress and passed
with people saying we have to stop destroying species. The act spe-
cifically prohibits "taking" a species. It was clear that this meant you
could not deliberately kill an endangered species, but it was not clear
whether you could eliminate habitat. Suppose, for example, I cut
down trees that could provide habitat for the red-cockaded wood-
pecker, an endangered species that lives in the southeastern United
States. Suppose that you know your neighbor cut down some pine
trees that had woodpeckers living in them and was fined by the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service. Now ask yourself this question: if wood-
peckers have not moved onto your property but are close by, would
you cut your trees sooner to eliminate the prospect of regulation under
the ESA? Researchers examined this question empirically and found
that, ceteris paribus, the average harvest on properties with no red-
cockaded woodpeckers in a 25 mile radius was approximately 70
years; with 25 colonies in a 25 mile radius, the average age dropped
to less than 40 years; and with over 400 colonies in a 25 mile radius,
the average dropped to less than 20 years.
Water provides another prime example of the problems with po-
litical environmentalism. Starting in 1902 with passage of the Rec-
lamation Act, the national government began building dams and wa-
ter delivery systems. No thought was given to impacts on free-
flowing rivers and salmon populations. The purpose of the Act was
to "make the desert bloom like a rose" through subsidies to irrigators.
Consider the fiscal implications of these subsidies. After the fed-
eral government had spent a good deal of money building dams in the
Uinta mountains of Utah, but had not completed the delivery system
for the Central Utah Project, Orrin Hatch, the senator from Utah,
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asked the Senate to appropriate funds to complete the Project. Bill
Bradley, the senator from New Jersey, called for the Congressional
Budget Office to do a benefit-cost analysis. The CBO found that the
marginal cost of delivering an acre foot of water (one foot of water
covering one acre of land or approximately 325,000 gallons) to the
farmers. was about $300. When that water was put on the crops,
mostly alfalfa, it was going to be worth less than $30 in added output.
The farmers, however, would pay less than eight dollars for that water
that would be worth $30 to them. Despite this analysis, the project
went forward. This is not about efficiency; it is about politics. In
fact, if you look at all the big federal projects in the West, you will be
hard pressed to find one that passes benefit-cost muster and this does
not include environmental costs.
Turning to pollution issues, Congress was quick to pass the Clean
Air Act and the Clean Water Act in the early 1970s. Those acts
cleared Congress with images of burning rivers and children not able
to play outside. To be sure, air and water quality have improved, but
no consideration is given to costs and benefits. And in some cases,
environmental quality may have gotten worse.
Take the case of the Clean Air Act amendments of 1977. These
amendments required that coal-fired power plants install scrubbers on
their smoke stacks to reduce sulfur emissions. Bruce Ackerman and
W.T. Hasler have explained that we could have had cleaner air by
burning low sulfur western coal, but that eastern coal interests lobbied
for scrubbers that were more costly and more polluting. Once scrub-
bers were required, dirtier eastern coal, which was cheaper, became
the preferred fuel. The air is dirtier and electricity is more expensive
thanks to political environmentalism.
FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM
The alternative I propose is free market environmentalism. For the
most part, markets have been seen as the cause of environmental
problems, not the solution. But free market environmentalism can be
summarized in two points. The first, and the one that I think is in-
creasingly understood, is that wealth makes a difference to environ-
mentalism. Those of us with full stomachs, good clothes to wear,
transportation, housing, medical care, education, and so on demand
and get a cleaner environment. As Aaron Wildavsky, the late politi-
cal scientist from Berkeley, liked to put it, "wealthier is healthier."
The second point is quite simply, incentives matter. Or as a Montana
rancher puts it, "if it pays, it stays."
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Data increasingly support the first point. Economists have esti-
mated the correlation between income and environmental quality and
have consistently found that, although there may be an initial degra-
dation of the environment as economic growth occurs, environmental
quality eventually increases with income. For many environmental
measures, the turning point is between a GDP of $4000 and $8000 per
capita. For others, such as wilderness designation or net-carbon re-
ductions, the turning point is much higher, but it still occurs. In his
book, The Skeptical Environmentalist, Bjorn Lomborg plots GDP per
capita by country against an index of environmental indicators. His
data again support the point that rich countries such as the United
States, Canada, or Japan have much cleaner environments than coun-
tries such as Ethiopia or Zimbabwe. Couple these data with the fact
that market-based economies with property rights and a rule of law
are more likely to have economic growth, and the case for free market
environmentalism begins to take shape.
The second point is supported by numerous case studies. For ex-
ample, in the East and the South, private landowners manage for land
values other than just timber, and they do so at a profit. The Interna-
tional Paper Company's wildlife and recreation program is a prime
example. International Paper employs specialists to oversee wildlife
and recreation on its lands, including the 16,000-acre Southlands Ex-
periment Forest located near Bainbridge, Georgia. At Southlands,
researchers develop forest management practices that enhance wild-
life populations as well as profits. White-tailed deer, turkeys, rabbits,
bobwhite quail, mourning dove, and other species are beginning to
reap the benefits of these new management techniques. Habitat is
improved by controlled burning, buffer zones along streams, and tree-
cutting practices that leave wildlife cover and plenty of forage.
According to company officials, investing in wildlife research and
habitat production makes sounds business sense. On its 1.2-million-
acre mid-South region, which includes parts of Texas, Louisiana, and
Arkansas, profits from hunting, hiking, fishing, and camping are an
impressive 25 percent of total profits. By far the biggest revenue
generator is the multiyear hunting lease. In early 1994, approxi-
mately 2,100 clubs paid from $2 to $5 per acre to lease company land
for hunting. Between 1977 and 1998, recreational revenue rose from
$300,000 to $5.5 million.
These returns from hunting leases paid dividends for wildlife as
well as for the company. Populations of deer, turkey, fox, quail, and
duck are up substantially since the program began. In addition, com-
pany biologists carry out an assortment of projects to help non-game
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species, from putting up bluebird boxes to protecting heron rookeries.
Even though non-game species have no explicit market, hunters,
campers, anglers, and hikers are willing to pay more for a diversified
experience.
Return to the wolf example for more free market environmental-
ism at work. The growing list of entrepreneurial pragmatists in the
environmental movement includes Hank Fischer, the former Northern
Rockies director of Defenders of Wildlife. Having fought in the
"wolf wars," Hank searched for a better alternative and came up with
an insurance-like strategy to protect both wolves and ranchers.
Wolves are viewed by ranchers in the same way that environmental-
ists view pollution; wolves reintroduced into Yellowstone National
Park spill out of its borders and harm ranchers when they kill an occa-
sional cow or sheep. To deal with this pollution problem, Defenders
of Wildlife established its privately funded wolf compensation fund
and offered to pay the ranchers for livestock losses due to wolf preda-
tion. Between its inception in 1987 and April 2000, the fund paid
compensation totaling $109,476.77 to 111 ranchers in the area sur-
rounding Yellowstone National Park, central Idaho, and northwestern
Montana.
Clearly this insurance-type scheme is not perfect because it does
not pay the rancher for the time spent proving that the animal was
killed by wolves or for the cost of actually purchasing a replacement
animal. According to Margaret Soulen Hinson, a sheep rancher in
Idaho who was paid from the fund for sheep lost to wolves, "[w]e
would rather have no losses than compensation."
But given the highly emotional climate surrounding wolf reintro-
duction, imperfection is not surprising. And because ranchers' his-
toric means of excluding wolves was to kill them, a system that com-
pensates for the conflicting use of habitat-ranchers wanting land for
grazing and environmentalists wanting it for wolves-moves wolf
policy in the direction of negotiated settlements. Even Margaret
Hinson recognizes that "it does make you more tolerant to participate
in this program."
To further improve the program, Defenders of Wildlife established
another fund to reward ranchers for allowing wolves to live on their
private property. Hank Fischer recognized that the compensation
program, at best, made ranchers neutral toward wolves; that is to say,
with compensation, ranchers are not being asked to bear the full cost.
By offering a reward to any rancher who has a wolf raise a litter of
pups on private property, Defenders is trying to change the incentives.
In the spring of 1994, a rancher near Augusta, Montana, collected a
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$5,000 reward from Defenders for having three wolf pups success-
fully raised on his property. The rancher told his cowboys to leave
the wolves alone following advice from state and federal biologists
about how to minimize human disturbance. By offering a reward to a
rancher who allows the raising of wolves on his land, Defenders may
be able to turn the liability of providing a public good into an asset.
To illustrate how free market environmentalism can work for pol-
lution, consider the Tar-Pamlico area of North Carolina. In 1983, a
serious fish kill occurred in Tar Pamlico Sound as a result of oxygen
depletion caused by nutrients, mainly phosphates and nitrates. This
happened despite the fact that The U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and state authorities had set water quality discharge
standards. All of the 26 regulated dischargers were in compliance
with the standards. To improve water quality in the sound through
tighter standards for point dischargers, the EPA estimated the cost to
be from $860 to $7,861. The cost of reaching the nutrient goal by
having farmers reduce their effluent ranged from $67 to $119 per
pound. To move in the direction of lowering the costs, the Tar-
Pamlico River Basin Association was formed in 1989. Recognizing
that command and control was likely to make dischargers face the
higher cost estimate, they suggested that its members help defray the
cost to farmers of reducing their discharge. By doing it this way, in-
stead of spending as much as $100 million to protect water quality,
the cost was only around $10 million.
My final example is the CAMPFIRE program (the Communal Ar-
eas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources) in southern
Africa. Entrepreneurs who understand the problems of wildlife man-
agement in southern Africa are working with the local communities
and national governments to change the incentives faced by indige-
nous people on the communal lands. Between 60 and 80 percent of
Africa's people live in rural areas, and the overwhelming majority of
them barely scrape by with subsistence farming and ranching. The
lands they use are communally owned, and the soils are often poor for
growing crops or forage for cattle. These same lands that are mar-
ginal for agriculture, however, can provide excellent wildlife habitat.
The problem is that sustainable wildlife populations have not meant
sustainable human populations.
CAMPFIRE is an entrepreneurial approach to rural development
based on the principle that the benefits from wildlife must go to those
who pay the financial and social costs of coexisting with wild ani-
mals. The CAMPFIRE concept devolves the responsibility of manag-
ing wildlife to local communities that can profit from it.
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The Nyaminyami District Council, with a human population of
35,000 and communal lands totaling 363,000 hectares, offers a prime
example of how CAMPFIRE can work. In 1989, its inaugural years,
Nyaminyami's CAMPFIRE project generated $108,800 from safari
hunting and another $18,800 from culling to keep local wildlife popu-
lations under control. With the major capital costs of $80,773 cov-
ered by funds donated by conservation groups, the district had $6,400
to distribute among the twelve separate communities after paying
operating and administrative costs and allocating 12 percent for capi-
tal investment and reserves. If these amounts seem small, realize that
the average income per household was less than $100 per year in
1989.
Another early CAMPFIRE success came in the Beitbridge District.
However, unlike Nyaminyami, the Beitbridge project was financed
completely by the returns from wildlife. Recognizing that different
communities within the district made more sacrifices to provide wild-
life habitat, the Beitbridge Council distributed wildlife profits un-
equally to communities within the district, giving more to those
communities that produced more higher-value animals. In 1990, the
Beitbridge District CAMPFIRE project generated approximately
$20,000 from hunting. Of that amount, the community of Chik-
warakwara received 87 percent of the total, because it was the top
wildlife producer. Two other neighboring communities received
much smaller amounts because of lower animal numbers. National
parks also paid the Beitbridge District Council $18,400 for revenues
accrued from past safari hunting, and from this amount, Chikwarak-
wara received another $8,000. Free to determine how to use their
proceeds, the people of Chikwarakwara decided to pay each of the
149 households in the community $80 as a wildlife dividend. The
remainder of the earnings went toward building a school and purchas-
ing a corn-grinding mill. Though the $80 dividend may not seem like
a lot to a wealthy westemer, it almost doubled the average annual
cash income for each family.
CONCLUSION
These examples are not the result of environmentalists suddenly
discovering the wisdom of Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations, but
are simply a matter of pragmatic people who probably do not know
anything about economics, who probably do not know a lot about
law, but who do know that, if you can get the incentives right, you are
more likely to save some of the things that you want. Aldo Leopold,
the author of the Sand County Almanac, clearly understood the impor-
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tance of incentives when he said "Conservation will ultimately boil
down to rewarding the private landowner who conserves the public
interest."
This is not to say that there is no role for government and regula-
tion. Regulations have helped improve the environment in some
cases, but for the most part we have picked the low fruit from the tree.
With the high fruit, i.e., high cost, left, we must find alternatives. If
we wish to continue to improve the environment, ultimately we are
going to have to turn the environment into an asset; make it some-
thing that people, who are the stewards, are rewarded for producing.
As Leigh Perkins, owner of the Orvis Company and long-time con-
servationist, said in his biography, "[a]s we move into this next cen-
tury, the environmental movement will have to rely more and more
on market solutions if we wish to conserve our precious natural re-
sources." If we can do this, we can get more stewardship and envi-
ronmental improvements with less acrimony.

